INTRODUCTION
Targeted advertising-the process by which advertisers direct their message at a specific demographic-is neither a recent 1 nor an irrational phenomenon. 2 One industry executive has proclaimed it the "rare win for everyone" because it serves producers, advertisers, and consumers alike. 3 It should be no surprise that the Information sector of the online economy-particularly new and social media platforms 4 with robust access to consumer data-has structured revenue streams to COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [42:1 nature of targeted advertising, including the propensity to mislead consumers, 13 and concomitant concerns about user privacy.
14 Acknowledging the ubiquity of targeted advertising and Internet Information Economy participants' market share and political will, this Note proposes several policies for regulating such data collection and transmission practices. Calls for regulations on targeted advertisements-particularly those linked to new and social media-are likely to be met with claims of a First Amendment violation, and invocations of the Commercial Speech Doctrine. 15 While the core of the Commercial Speech Doctrine captures speech proposing a commercial transaction, 16 it also encompasses "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." 17 Targeted advertising hosted on Internet Information Economy platforms poses a unique challenge to this paradigm. Its reliance on consumer data directly implicates the consumer more so than with "traditional" commercial speech. 18 willing to defer to tech companies' efforts to regulate themselves, but this may be changing." Transcript of Zuckerberg's Senate Hearing, Wash. Post (Apr. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/8URT-XY9W; see also Facebook Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 16 (Feb. 1, 2018) (" [T] he application, interpretation, and enforcement of [U.S. federal and state and foreign laws and regulations] are often uncertain, particularly in the new and rapidly evolving industry in which we operate, and may be interpreted and applied inconsistently . . . For example, regulatory or legislative actions affecting the manner in which we display content to our users or obtain consent to various practices could adversely affect user growth and engagement.").
13. Facebook, Facebook Here Together (UK), YOUTUBE (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q4zd7X98eOs. In the spring of 2018, Facebook admitted to its users' data being compromised. In an effort to restore customer goodwill, Facebook released an advertising campaign in which Facebook employed the passive voice to describe the series of recent news items and pitfalls facing the company, seemingly to shift blame away from the company. The text of the campaign is excerpted in relevant part: "But then something happened. We had to deal with spam clickbait, spam, data misuse. That's going to change. From now on, Facebook will do more to keep you safe and protect your privacy. 15. The Commercial Speech Doctrine grew out of a compromise to recognize certain, albeit limited, First Amendment protections for commercial speech but not to accord it the full panoply of protection reserved for 'higher value' political speech. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (citing Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law § § 12-15, 903 (2d ed. 1998) ("The entire commercial speech doctrine . . . represents an accommodation between the right to speak and hear expression about goods and services and the right of government to regulate the sales of such goods and services.").
16. 
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In order to develop an appropriate standard of review for potential regulations, this Note first addresses data collection and transmission methods in the light of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding commercial speech. Although the Supreme Court considered data mining in the context of a commercial speech case in 2011, the Court ultimately left more questions open than answered. 19 Rather than confront the commercial speech question directly, the Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. invalidated a patient privacy law on viewpoint discrimination grounds and applied "heightened scrutiny" without further elucidation. In acknowledging the narrow grounds on which the case was decided, the Court motioned to the status of data collection and transmission as a contentious open issue for future cases to address, including whether data flows qualify as speech. 20 Circuit court decisions have concluded that Sorrell did not rewrite commercial speech jurisprudence. Instead, the intermediate scrutiny test announced in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York continues to be good law. 21 However, Sorrell showed that a growing contingent of Justices are inclined to find incidental burdens on speech that trigger First Amendment analysis as a way to avoid reading regulations as primarily addressing economic concerns. Effectively, these members of the Court have chiseled away at the government's ability to promulgate regulations on commercial speakers. Simultaneously, the Court has broadened the scope of its inquiry when striking regulations. Whereas in its nascence, commercial speech was judged through the lens of the consumer, the Court has begun to give more heft to the interests of the commercial speaker. 22 While neutral in theory, listener and speaker interests may not always align so congruently.
The critical concern for regulators in the Internet Information Economy postSorrell is whether there exists an appropriate balance between the speaker's interest in data collection and transmission and the consumer's interest in privacy and receiving accurate information without running afoul of the First Amendment. The ability to manipulate direct-to-consumer messaging via data collection and transmission challenges the original conceit of the Commercial Speech Doctrine to increase consumer information and to prevent fraud and coercion. Indeed, the government has largely ceded any regulatory imperative to the Internet Information Economy platforms themselves, without creating a satisfying oversight mechanism. 23 19. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 20. Id. at 579 ("The capacity of technology to find and publish personal information, including records required by the government, presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure.").
21. Although Sorrell notably used the phrase "heightened scrutiny" as applied in a commercial speech case, the intermediate framework has long since been subject to threat. This Note argues first, that the Commercial Speech Doctrine as currently conceived is an ill-fitting tool for resolving difficult free speech questions in the context of data, privacy, and the modern Internet Information Economy. The application of the Commercial Speech Doctrine to a particular economic interaction should not be a nigh-complete bar to the regulation of Internet platforms that profit from data collection and transmission. 24 For this reason, qualified constitutional protection appropriately accounts for the speaker's interests while not short-changing those of the listener/consumer. This Note proposes that regulators and reviewing tribunals consider the context surrounding the data collection and transmission process, including: method of collection, relationship between miner and mined party, and whether the user has consented to such collection in justifying the relative need for regulation. 25 Second, in order to vindicate the Commercial Speech Doctrine's initial purposes, more transparency of data collection procedures for use in targeted advertising is warranted and indeed possible as a regulatory hook to protect consumers, despite the Court's move towards according more protection to commercial speakers.
In so doing, this Note builds upon Erin Bernstein and Theresa J. Lee's Where the Consumer Is the Commodity: The Difficulty with the Current Definition of Commercial Speech, which proposes that the "rise of new non-linear commercial transactions" necessitates a shift in the definition of commercial speech to accommodate the seismic change in the modern online economy. 26 The stakes are not inconsequential: failure to expand the scope of commercial speech would foreclose the use of many tools in a legislature's arsenal to address current concerns related to consumer privacy and eliminating advertisements that seek to capitalize on discriminatory indicia, 27 among other salient policy issues.
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Part I details the Court's jurisprudence regarding both personal solicitations and data practices and considers the shift away from a bifurcated speech paradigm that treats commercial speech as speech of "lesser value." Part II illustrates the most common forms of data collection and transmission. Part III locates these methods of data collection and transmission within the current commercial speech framework to conclude that qualified constitutional protection is the coherent tier of scrutiny that should apply. Part IV proposes policy recommendations that fit within the Court's current approach to commercial speech and alternatives that would require a departure from the present doctrine.
I. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Although commercial speech falls under the umbrella of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has deemed it deserving of less than full constitutional protection. In Central Hudson, the Court announced an intermediate level of scrutiny test to be applied to regulations of commercial speech. 29 Provided that the speech is neither misleading nor relates to unlawful activity, the regulation must: (i) further a "substantial" regulatory interest; (ii) be proportionate to that interest; and (iii) "directly advance" that interest.
30
In order to analyze fruitfully any proposed regulation of data collection and transmission, this Note reviews the Court's nebulous jurisprudence regarding targeted advertising. This Part also examines Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 31 as it both represents the Court's latest articulation of the applicable standards of review and indicates gaps that regulators might exploit. The basis on which Sorrell was decided does not make it binding precedent with regard to how future courts may evaluate a future commercial speech case. However, it is relevant in illustrating the modern Court's discomfort with the bifurcated conception of commercial speech as intrinsically of lower value. 447, 464 (1978) . In Ohralik, the Court upheld a prophylactic ban on an attorney's in-person solicitations, finding a sufficiently "substantial" regulatory interest in corralling its bar licensees and protecting the public from harmful solicitation. In subsequent cases, the Court acknowledged the narrow holding of Ohralik, due in no small part to the "unique features" associated with the particular solicitations in the case-the petitioner attorney had solicited business from injured individuals lying in hospice. Edenfield v. Fane 33 Broadly, the Court held that "the constitutionality of a ban on personal solicitation will depend upon the identity of the parties and the precise circumstances of the solicitation." 34 In determining whether to uphold a ban on personal solicitation, the Court articulated a multi-factor balancing test examining: (i) whether the speaker is a "professional trained in the art of persuasion;" (ii) whether the speaker has an incentive to act responsibly when engaged in solicitation; (iii) the susceptibility of a listener to "manipulation," which contemplates how sophisticated the listener is; (iv) whether the listener has an "independent basis" for evaluating the solicitation; (v) whether the listener has some existing professional relationship with the speaker; and (vi) whether the listener can rationally consider the advertisement as opposed to merely "acquiesc [ing] ."
A. JURISPRUDENCE RELATED TO PERSONAL SOLICITATIONS

35
The Court concentrated on protecting the interests of the listener-in this case, the prospective future client. 36 As described below, the Edenfield factors can provide regulators a means to measure the viability of proposed legislation on Internet Information Economy platforms.
B. CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING DATA: SORRELL
Although Sorrell v. IMS Health engaged the Court in a substantive examination of data collection and transmission methods, the grounds on which the Court decided the case renders it not binding precedent for commercial speech cases. However, it is instructive insofar as it reveals drafting pitfalls. In dicta, the Court impliedly questioned the continued viability of the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard, leading to some confusion in lower courts. 37 In this respect, Sorrell continued the Court's shift away from the categorical speech model that treats commercial speech as of lesser import, though it did not announce a doctrinal departure from settled case law.
Sorrell concerned a challenge to Vermont's Prescription Confidentiality Law, designed to prohibit health insurers from selling, licensing, or exchanging "prescriber-identifiable information . . . for marketing or promoting a prescription drug" unless the prescribing doctor so consented. 38 response to a growing concern that pharmacies with access to patient prescribing information were selling this data to pharmaceutical marketers who would then target doctors. 39 Although data mining companies claimed that the law's treatment of prescriber data infringed upon their First Amendment rights, the legislature defended the regulation as a means to protect patient and doctor privacy and to reduce drug costs. Crucially, the law did not prohibit marketers from advertising at all. Rather, it sought to limit access to certain forms of information that marketers would rely on to make their advertisements more efficient without a doctor opting in to the system. The law did, however, permit patient collected data to be distributed to universities for research purposes and to insurance companies.
In their petition for certiorari, the state of Vermont broadened the scope of the legal issues to include the "burgeoning business" of "commercial data-mining." 40 The State framed the issue as one involving a law protecting and limiting access to non-public personal information, and argued that the First Amendment does not give license to data-mining companies accessing such private information.
41
By contrast, the data-mining companies and advertisers highlighted the perceived restrictions on their ability to engage in commercial speech. Accordingly, the State was engaged in viewpoint discrimination by hampering their ability to communicate with prescribing doctors, while allowing the information to "be purchased or acquired by other speakers with diverse purposes and viewpoints." 42 The respondents were joined by a host of amici including representatives of the advertising industry who wrote to defend the use of data in modern advertising.
Ultimately, the Court glossed over the technological intricacies of data collection, instead finding both content-and viewpoint-based restrictions and subjecting the law to strict scrutiny. 43 As it determined the statute was deficient under both intermediate and heightened scrutiny, the Court did not rely on a Central Hudson analysis. Some commentators attributed this sidestep to the Court's traditional hesitancy to wade heavily into emerging areas of technology that may become outdated and to avoid fixing constitutional doctrine on such an unsteady foundation.
44
As to whether data is speech, the Court broadly announced that "[t]he creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First 39. Id. at 576 (citing Vermont's legislative findings regarding the Patient Confidentiality Law). The legislature expressed concern that these marketing campaigns encouraged doctors to prescribe brandname drugs that were more expensive than generics and that, based on an incomplete patient profile, might be less safe for patients. 46 Bartnicki overturned provisions of a wiretap act that prohibited the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications. The Court held that "privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance." 47 However, communications involving discussions with a teacher's union during collective bargaining negotiations has a different flavor of privacy than medical data-or even data used for personalized advertising-based on the former's nexus to a matter of public concern. As it neither directly nor indirectly touches on the commercial speech doctrine, Bartnicki is better grouped with New York Times v. Sullivan and the First Amendment's commitment to disseminating and removing obstacles to distribution of matters of public importance. 48 Second, the Court relied on Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., a defamation suit involving false statements in a credit report. 49 The Court, applying Gertz v. Robert Welch and New York Times v. Sullivan, held that the assertions in the credit report were not matters of public concern. The Court in Dun & Bradstreet found that the speech at issue, while "not totally unprotected by the First Amendment," enjoyed "less stringent" protections, in part because the credit report "concern[ed] no public issue," and was demonstrably false and damaging. 50 While the plurality held a "credit report is 'speech,'" 51 it did not find that credit reporting is commercial speech, despite requesting supplemental briefing on the issue. 52 Dun & Bradstreet stands for the proposition that privacy interests weigh more heavily in the context of private business interest rather than traditional public issue speech. 45 53 Rubin invalidated a provision banning beer companies from displaying the alcohol content on labels. The law was intended to prevent "strength wars" between competing brewers, a tap from which deleterious consequences might readily flow. 54 The Court defended its holding on the basis of removing impediments to increase consumer access to information. 55 However, its relevance to the facts of Sorrell is quite limited, since Rubin did not address the privacy concerns raised in Sorrell.
56
The few words spent on data specifically may actually prove a boon to those seeking to find a legally sufficient way to enact privacy legislation. 57 Indeed, the majority's ending remarks acknowledge the narrow grounds on which Sorrell was decided, and just how much is left to be resolved regarding data mining: "The capacity of technology to find and publish personal information, including records required by the government, presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure." 58 The opinion provides only the barest advice for future regulators, with the majority stating, "In considering how to protect those interests . . . the State cannot engage in content-based discrimination to advance its own side of a debate."
59 Vermont had gone too far. Though the dissent only garnered three votes, it highlights the doctrinal clash between a growing First Amendment jurisprudence friendly to commercial speakers and the scores of economic regulations that will incidentally touch on speech. Justice Breyer's dissent described the Vermont law as one "related to a lawful governmental effort to regulate a commercial enterprise." 60 For this reason, there was no need to scrutinize the statute under the First Amendment.
61 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, took issue with the majority's opening "a Pandora's Box of First Amendment challenges to many ordinary regulatory practices that may only incidentally affect a commercial message."
62
The dissent also noted that the majority's categorization of the restriction as either "content-based" or "speakerbased" had never "before justified greater scrutiny when regulatory activity 53 . Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570 (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.) ("Both parties agree that the information on beer labels constitutes commercial speech.").
54. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 479 (1995). 55. Id. at 484. 56. In an overview of its commercial speech doctrine, the Court emphasized "the free flow of commercial information is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system because it informs the numerous private decisions that drive the system." The split within the Court reveals the disagreement between those justices ready to extend more First Amendment protections to all speakers-removing the artificial divide between commercial and non-commercial speech-and those who would view such a move as upending much of the current regulation on commerce.
C. APPROACHES TO COMMERCIAL SPEECH CASES POST-SORRELL
Following Sorrell, the conclusion is that Central Hudson remains untouched as the lodestar of commercial speech analysis. An alternative reading of Sorrell suggests a shift in the Court's jurisprudence that seeks to provide further constitutional protections to commercial speakers. 64 As support, the Court alluded to the viability of Commercial Speech Doctrine in Matal v. Tam, decided in 2016, where it held that the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act violated the First Amendment.
65
As in Sorrell, the majority opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurrence centered on the untenable viewpoint discrimination ensconced in the Trademark Act. 66 Having identified viewpoint discrimination, the Court could dispose of the case without reaching commercial speech issues. In this way, an intermediate scrutiny standard can be manipulated to be functionally equivalent to a strict scrutiny analysis. 69 The Court has implicitly laid the foundation for eradicating the categorical carve-out accorded to commercial speech. 70 Uncertainty over the reach of commercial speech permits classifying speech on the margin as non-commercial. 71 Further, fear of failing to 63 . Id. at 588 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 66. Id. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("To permit viewpoint discrimination in this context is to permit Government censorship.").
67. Justice Kennedy's concurrence bypasses any application of Central Hudson. Finding that the disparagement clause presented an irreconcilable instance of viewpoint discrimination, the Court applied heightened scrutiny. Id. at 1767.
68. Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("I continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as 'commercial.'").
69. Redish & Voils, supra note 21, at 774 ("Indeed, it seems that, in almost all facets, the Court now affords truthful commercial speech virtually as much First Amendment protection as it does noncommercial speech."). 71. "If affixing the commercial label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social "volatility," free speech would be endangered." Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1765.
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protect speech against government encroachment doctrinally presumes deregulation is the preferable course. The implication is that, should such an approach continue to garner a minimum of five votes, the Court will downplay the concerns of Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Ginsburg regarding the continued viability of economic regulations that implicate-however tangentially-speech interests. 72 Post-Matal, regulations of commercial speech seeking to withstand the current Court's searching scrutiny must thread a very thin needle.
However, seven years after the Court handed down the Sorrell decision, circuit courts continue to apply Central Hudson, despite the Court's application of "heightened scrutiny."
73 Some circuits have read Sorrell as tacking on a predicate inquiry prior to applying Central Hudson, whereby the Court must first determine whether the restriction is content or speaker based. 74 But regardless of this "two step," the Central Hudson framework remains viable provided that challenged regulations do not fatally engage in viewpoint discrimination.
75
D. SPEECH FOR WHOSE BENEFIT, THE SPEAKER OR THE LISTENER?
The bulk of First Amendment jurisprudence derives from the importance of protecting the interests of the speaker. Commercial speech, by contrast, takes the perspective of the listener into account. Early on, the Court vindicated "the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information," and struck regulations it deemed too paternalistic. 76 Motivated by the premise that a listener ought to have access to necessary and factual information that would enable autonomous decisions, 77 the Court blessed regulations that policed false and Per the Court's initial conceit, commercial speech should be accorded fewer constitutional protections because the speaker does not enjoy the same dignitary and democratic interests that flow from other modes of First Amendment speech or conduct. Commercial speech, unlike non-commercial, is objectifiable, and the veracity of the speech can be deduced. Because a profit motive renders it "hardy," commercial speech requires fewer constitutional protections. 80 Professor Robert Post opined that commercial speech is accorded some protections, not because it permits the speaker and listener alike to engage in "democratic legitimacy," but merely because it facilitates an informational exchange. 81 Per Post, the Supreme Court has established a legal taxonomy that privileges "public discourse" among First Amendment values.
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Chief among the First Amendment purposes is safeguarding the ability of citizens to criticize robustly the state and to remove impediments to such discourse. Commercial speech, in this model, does not advance a democratic system so regulations of it are less troubling.
The opposing view argues that, even in the absence of strong speaker interests, commercial speech should not be denied the full panoply of constitutional protections. 83 In advocating for the leveling up of constitutional protections for commercial speakers, Professor Martin Redish questions depressing the level of scrutiny based purely on a speaker's "self-interest, economic or otherwise." 84 Professor Redish theorizes that, for no other reason than an "ideologically driven desire to penalize those who benefit from the capitalistic system," jurisprudence singles out commercial speech. Professor Redish defends the "catalytic role that the corporate form plays in fostering individual self-realization." 86 As support, he locates the corporate form in Jacksonian democratic theory, which allowed the American everyman to limit his liability to compete on a wider stage. Commercial speech is not devoid of value simply because it is bound up in economics. Nor should the status of a speaker as a participant in commerce somehow result in his enjoying fewer protections. A formal conception of commercial speech inextricable from profit maximization glosses over the nuances otherwise present in First Amendment analysis. Further, such an approach ignores the permeability between commercial and non-commercial speech in practice.
In the last four decades, the Court has gradually dialed up the protections accorded to commercial speakers. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Court focused on the interest of speakers-tobacco retailers and manufacturers-in "conveying truthful information about their products." 87 Commentators have noted this trend of commercial speakers toward reframing challenges to regulations under First Amendment cover. 88 Professor Frederick Schauer has termed this strategy, "First Amendment opportunism." 89 Tilting its hand toward speakers, the Court has toughened the Central Hudson prongs and raised the bar for the government to clear.
Ultimately, however, neither Post's nor Redish's frameworks of the Commercial Speech Doctrine maps in a satisfactory way onto the modern framework of targeted advertising-where the listener serves as a predicate provider of data to the speaker, in some instances without the listener's knowledge. Here, the interests of the listener and speaker may be at odds without a satisfactory approach to reconciling this divergence. Further, to the extent commercial speech contemplates two discrete parties, it is inadequate to fit in the role of the service provider that connects the speaker and listener-but is itself motivated by commercial interests as well.
II. DATA COLLECTION
This Part details methods of data collection and transmission in the Internet Information Economy. Such platforms present unique challenges to regulators and to the First Amendment given that the commercial activity of these innovative platforms fully implicate the listener. The targeted advertising scheme contemplates three players: the user, the advertiser, and the social media platform-a data repository that can package user data into valuable "dossiers. LinkedIn. 91 The collection and transmission of data, insofar as data may be imbued with speech properties, functions as a structural obstacle to effective regulation. Second, these companies jettison the traditional framework for monetizing services. Rather than charge users access fees, the new model instead leverages user data to sustain the service. Given the first postulate that data has value, a conceptual "swap" of money for data is structurally coherent even if the user does not realize the implicit "cost."
92 While new and social media do increase consumer welfare, that is not to the exclusion of their own financial interests. 93 Provided users continue to generate content, there is no likely natural end to the proliferation of targeted advertisements.
A. TYPES OF DATA COLLECTED
Advertising algorithms parse particular traits to match with data collected and transmitted via new and social media platforms. In short, every key stroke, comment, and disclosure of data functions as an "ad targeting attribute."
94 Over time, with repeated user inputs and increasingly specific audience parameters, targeting can become "more fine grained."
95 Demographic indicia enables an advertiser to collate, among other things, a user's gender, income, employment, age;
96 geographic data reveals a user's location; behavioral data analyzes a user's browsing activity. According to Facebook's Ad Manager platform, an interested marketer can tailor ads by selecting the relevant indicia from a score of potential data points. 97 Additionally, Facebook and Instagram now allow advertisers to rely on "Personally Identifiable Information," which includes the user's name, email 91. Facebook Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/93SG-HYX8. "In 2017, we continued to focus on our three main revenue growth priorities: . . . (ii) developing innovative ad products that help businesses get the most of their ad campaigns, and (iii) making our ads more relevant and effective through our targeting capabilities and outcome-based measurement." 92. A user may be lulled into complacency when there is no hit to his wallet or may be led to attribute misplaced goodwill to companies who appear to generously donate their services.
93. Redish, supra note 83, emphasizes that a commercial nexus or co-motivation should not serve as grounds on which to deprive particular rights.
94 
B. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION
The following two sections survey data collection and transmission within the Internet Information Economy before focusing on Facebook's particular methods.
100
Online data collection for use in targeted advertising relies on proxies, drawing on a user's history and expressed preferences to deduce the most relevant advertisements.
101 Typically, such collection is via cookie installation on a user's Internet browser. 102 Cookies are small text files that a website places on the computer of any visitor to that site. 103 Their data gathering capacity ranges based on tracking duration and the quantity and quality of data collected. 104 The entity , https://perma.cc/VM53-WZHR ("But the internet simply would not work without cookies-they are a fundamental currency of the internet, enabling web analytics as well as tailoring the online experience, compiling a browsing history and the rest."). 'Permanent' cookies attach to a user's hard drive and follow the user to subsequent visits to other sites. Scientific American, Use of Cookies, https://perma.cc/HC9B-XF9Y (last visited Jan. 9, 2018). An additional distinction is between 'first party' and 'third party' cookies. First-party cookies are placed by the website that a user is currently visiting. Online Tracking, supra note 102. By contrast, a third-party cookie is placed by a different domain than the website the user COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF Cookies, however, are not compatible with mobile devices, forcing advertisers to adapt their data collection and transmission mechanisms. Computers, particularly household computers, are often shared, diminishing the effectiveness of targeted ads.
106 By contrast, mobile trackers rely primarily on unique "device identifiers" that allow advertisers to follow a user's unique code, thereby solving an inherent verification problem with cookie usage. 107 In exchange for more personalized advertisements that appear on a mobile device, the consumer is exposed to more intrusive tracking.
108
Access to Facebook and the site's ability to amass data is predicated on a user disclosing personal information, which is aggregated for future advertising matches. Initially, Facebook supplemented the data keyed into its site by partnering with thirdparty websites to obtain user browsing history.
109 Data-mining firms that amass user data based on cookies, information gathered from government records surveys, and private sources 110 can match their user profile to the Facebook generated profile. This maps into a robust profile of any user. 111 As of the time of publication, Facebook has announced that it will cease integrating with third party data brokers.
112
Although Facebook will no longer serve as the junction receiving input from both the data broker and the advertiser, nothing precludes the data broker from rerouting the data to feed the advertiser directly for advertisements that will be curated for and displayed to Facebook users. 108. Id. ("The mobile device ID is a powerful piece of information because it's a window into the most used device by consumers. Gaining insight into how they are spending their time on mobile (app downloads, app usage, etc.) is extremely valuable to understanding their interests, media preferences, and consumer behaviors.").
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C. METHODS OF DATA TRANSMISSION
Broadly speaking, advertisements reach consumers via an intermediary auction platform.
114 Data is sold to advertisers and ad-networks through an auction either by contracting directly with websites or with Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
115
Facebook and Google each host their own auction, where the winner proposes the most relevant advertisement, not the highest bid. 116 Recently, Facebook and Google rolled out the "Custom Audience" feature to their respective advertising interfaces. An advertiser uploads "Personally Identifying Information" about a user that the advertiser desires to target specifically. This powerful targeting system inverts the traditional model by enabling the advertiser to select specific users ex ante, as opposed to drilling down by attributes.
117 Across all methods of data collection, the underlying concern remains the relative lack of transparency about the process of reaching the consumer.
118
III. CONCEPTUALIZING DATA COLLECTION AND TRANSMISSION WITHIN CURRENT COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
The paucity of claims challenging data collection and transmission is commonly attributed to the claim that consumers willingly give up their data in a rational costbenefit exchange.
119 However, a 2015 study conducted by the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania found that consumers' furnishing of their data may be explained by (i) a sense of resignation about the inevitability of 119. Joseph Turow, Michael Hennessy & Nora Draper, supra note 3, at 7 ("Marketers enthuse over the idea that people's acceptance of the general idea of tradeoffs justifies marketers' collection of enough data points about consumers to lead to the kind of personalization Yahoo calls the pathway to advertising nirvana") (internal citations omitted). COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS
[42:1 data collection and (ii) ignorance of the ways in which digital commerce operates and where the current legal regime fails to protect their interests. 120 The growth of personalized solicitations has eroded the democratizing effects of an open marketplace and undermined consumer autonomy.
121
The Annenberg study indicates that consumers are not receiving the types of information that Commercial Speech Doctrine seeks to guarantee.
122
This Part weighs legal arguments in favor of increasing and decreasing protections for targeted advertising. Considering the philosophical underpinnings of commercial speech and lower courts' recent treatment of related cases, qualified constitutional protection best vindicates listener interests in data privacy and usage, and receipt of accurate information. Subjecting regulations to this tier of scrutiny addresses the current legal interstices and ensures informed consumer consent when furnishing data within the Internet Information Economy.
A. ADVERTISING INDUSTRY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF "LEVELED-UP" SPEECH PROTECTIONS
An oft-cited justification for increased constitutional protections is the challenge in adequately distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial speech.
123
The advertising industry, joined by libertarian scholars, contends "[t]he First Amendment safeguards the entire communication process, including the gathering of data used to create a commercial or non-commercial message."
124 Narrowly defined commercial speech should capture only speech explicitly proposing a commercial transaction; speech outside of that scope is entitled to the full panoply of First Amendment protection. 125 The Supreme Court has been sympathetic to positing that ex ante raw user data does not "propose a commercial transaction."
126
Even applying Central Hudson's broader definition of commercial speech, data that 120. Id. at 8-9. 121. Id. at 19. Among the reported findings, the survey revealed fundamental misconceptions surrounding consumer choice. The survey highlights the existence of "tailored offers" which may not reflect the best price or option depending on a consumer's particular demographics.
122. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982) (op. of Brennan, J.) ("We have held that in a variety of contexts 'the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.'") (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). In the commercial context, the audience's right to receive information exists as a predominant right, not one that is solely derived from the speaker's right to engage in commercial speech. The emphasis, thus, must always be on the audience and in ensuring that the audience receives factually true and not misleading information.
123 Advertisers claim that regulations that render the targeted message less 'individualized' represent an untenable violation of the First Amendment. The Tenth Circuit has held that "a restriction on speech tailored to a particular audience, 'targeted speech,' cannot be cured simply by the fact that a speaker can speak to a larger indiscriminate audience." 127 The court found impermissible restrictions on an advertiser's ability to reach its desired audience by prohibiting the use of personal information to target consumers. However, no other circuits have expressly adopted the Tenth Circuit's stance on restrictions to targeted advertising as constituting de facto impermissible burdens, and the D.C. Circuit has distinguished its approach to weighing regulatory interests under Central Hudson.
128
A generous reading in favor of "leveling up" constitutional protections for consumer data draws strength from the interests of the speaker. Internet Information Economy platforms argue that such data practices are not merely economic but are imbued with other speech properties and concomitant constitutional protections. The counter position does not deny that the ultimate commercial message is not deserving of First Amendment protections. Rather, as Professor Neil Richards prophesizes, finding data to be speech would result in "every restriction on the disclosure-not to mention the collection or use-of information [facing] heightened First Amendment scrutiny."
129 Although the advertising industry and advocates for increased speech 127. U.S. W., Inc. v. F.C.C., 182 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999). U.S. West challenged the FCC's regulation obligating telecommunications companies to obtain consent prior to the companies' using "customer proprietary network information" (CPNI) in marketing initiatives. In applying a Central Hudson analysis, the Court narrowly read the government's asserted privacy right as avoiding "undue embarrassment or ridicule" as a result of disseminating private information, ultimately finding this was not sufficient. Id. at 1235. Although the regulations did not cover the substance of what a company could say to its customers or limit the breadth of such messaging, the Tenth Circuit, in applying Central Hudson found the regulations impermissible "restrictions on speech." In determining what was commercial speech, the Court included not only the marketing to the consumers, but also "intra-carrier" speech based on CPNI as "integral to and inseparable from the ultimate commercial solicitation." Id. at 1233 n.4. "deliberately designed to disrupt knowledge creation," and therefore "presumptively illegitimate." Bambauer, supra note 25, at 60, 70. That position concedes that such a rule would call into question almost every existing privacy regime. Id. at 61-62. However, for the purposes of this Note, both the Court and regulators can-as the Court did in Sorrell-side-step an ultimate determination as applied to legislation specifically aimed at targeted advertising. This Note instead identifies a situation in which contemplated privacy regulations, while they might incidentally burden some commercial speech, are not enacted with the desire-expressed or inferred-to curtail the creation or dissemination of information. As long as Internet Information Economy platforms continue to operate free of charge, they are fundamentally businesses seeking to advertise as effectively as possible. For these reasons, the ensuing analyses progress from the premise that much of the data at issue contains a commercial nexus and should COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS
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B. CLASSIFYING DATA COLLECTION AS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
The appeal of classifying data collection and transmission as purely economic activity, rather than speech, is to obtain the lower rational basis judicial scrutiny of data regulations-rather than strict scrutiny, were it speech. This tier increases the likelihood that such regulations would be deemed constitutional. 130 The argument proceeds from finding that user data is non-expressive and therefore not speech. This is the argument Justice Breyer put forth in his dissent in Sorrell. 131 Recall that the alternate ground on which the case was decided means that Sorrell does not provide clear guidance on the viability of labeling data a commodity. Instead, the lack of binding precedent on this issue provides regulators some leeway.
Framing data collection and transmission as a passive economic activity treats the input of data into a platform as a mere exchange for access. As an exemplar for the ensuing legal analyses, this Note focuses on Facebook's practices. 132 Facebook bases its business model upon packaging user data into monetizable and discrete bundles of individualized consumer data. Facebook's intake of the initial data when a user first launches his or her profile is supplemented by tracking cookies and other software, which provide continuous forms of data collection back to the platform. Effectively, the user has paid in his or her data in order for access to the site. Each continued use functions as a credit to the service platform, which is now amassing a warehouse of particularized data.
be evaluated under a separate First Amendment framework. Further, the specific contents of the advertisement are not themselves tailored to the individual; rather, it is the means by which the advertisement reaches the consumer, as determined by data collection and transmission practices, which are at issue.
130. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.").
131. See Part I.B, supra. The Court in Sorrell expressly declined Vermont's request that sales, transfers and use of prescriber identifying information be treated as non-expressive conduct not speech. In fact, the Court ruled that the outcome in the case would be the same regardless of whether it treated the information as a "mere commodity." Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011).
132. At the outset, this Note flagged several recognized platforms that comprise the Internet Information Economy, namely, Facebook, Google, Instagram, and LinkedIn. Each platform operates in slightly different ways, whether as a difference in how ad buys are conducted, how the platform stores user data, and whether the platform sells the data directly to advertisers or retains it itself to serve as an intermediary 'match-maker' of sorts between user and advertiser. This Note will only emphasize Facebook. This selection was made for several reasons: primarily, the ubiquity of Facebook and the recent issues surrounding certain advertisements displayed on the platform have led to calls for some form of regulation of the platform directly. Second, Facebook's size and popularity worldwide make it a fitting subject of analysis. Third, given Facebook's penchant for acquiring smaller platforms (i. According full First Amendment protection to Facebook's data collection and transmission risks overly insulating a commercial transaction from necessary economic regulation. Instead, Facebook serves as a broker for advertisers to facilitate the transmission of information. Matching advertisers with users is not an expressive speech act but an economic arrangement, categorically distinct from use of the platform to advance political ideas. Although the users may be engaged in speech, it does not necessarily follow that Facebook, the platform, is engaged in speech production or expressive conduct per se. For example, the user's act of liking a politician's public page indicates an endorsement of that figure. 133 The analytical gap occurs in claiming Facebook is speaking when, as a result of user activity, that user's data is used to service a relevant ad buy. The argument delineates speech from Facebook's algorithmic pairing. However, this framework falters given the jurisprudence concerning computer source code holding that the code itself can garner First Amendment protection.
134
There remains a fundamental obstacle to classifying data as economic activity. Commodities which may appear divorced from speech have, based on a nexus to First Amendment protected conduct, been accorded First Amendment protection. For example, the Court held an ink and paper tax violated the First Amendment based on the burdens it imposed on print media. 135 Similarly, circuit courts have concluded that computer source code is "an expressive means for the exchange of information and ideas about computer programming," warranting First Amendment protections.
136
The doctrinal move to label Facebook-user interactions purely economic appears unlikely to garner support either in the Court or among regulators for two reasons: (i) prior precedent counters against a bright-line pronouncement that subjects data to mere economic regulations; 137 and (ii) the Court tends to classify borderline conduct as worthy of speech protections, in the interest of erring on the side of promoting speaker interests. The end-stage commoditization of a user's activity does not rob a user's activity of its inherent speech quality. In Bland v. Roberts, the Fourth Circuit held that a "like" on Facebook both "constituted pure speech" and "symbolic expression" in the context of local government officials who had "liked" the Facebook page of a local political candidate. 138 The Bland court found the activity of liking the page to be the "Internet equivalent of displaying a political sign in one's front yard, which the Supreme Court has held is substantive speech." 139 The resulting inquiry is whether ex ante speech is stripped of its speech properties by virtue of its downstream uses. The hybrid nature of data, which both facilitates commercial transactions and retains some expressive aspects, suggests that neither full First Amendment protection nor lack of such protection is the appropriate path to chart. Instead, the next section considers a third alternative.
C. DATA USED IN TARGETED SOLICITATION WARRANTS QUALIFIED PROTECTION
The Intermediate Scrutiny Framework Vindicates Listener Interests
Commentators have expressed discomfort at the thought of online users unwittingly serving as fodder for commercial activity by virtue of participating in the new Internet Information Economy.
140
They contend the current bounds of commercial speech fail to reach business models that harvest data from users instead of charging a fee for service, but nevertheless engage in commercial activity. 141 Likewise, empirical research reveals consumer concern over a general lack of transparency over data practices.
142
In keeping with the prevailing-though challenged-framework of applying reduced constitutional protections to commercial speech, three factors characterize the exchange of data used in targeted advertising between a service platform and an advertiser. First, data transmission for advertising exists in a transactional space. The exchanging parties each derive a benefit and are motivated by commercial gain. Second, the exchanged data pertains to private matters, or at least touches on matters of private concern.
143 To be sure, certain inputs that a user might include in a profile are publicly available, but the complete aggregation where a digital person emerges is distinct. There exists a spectrum of information that can be collected about an individual-ranging from the innocuous to the intrusive. The degree of privacy protections ought to be keyed to the degree of intrusiveness.
144 Third, the two-party matrix involving the Internet Information Economy platform and the advertiser excises the user. This section considers each of these factors in turn to support the conclusion that regulations on data collection and transmission ought not be accorded 144. Privacy, in the Internet age, might be better reframed in light of the user's expectations that certain actions or material shared will not be later used by a third party.
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full First Amendment protection, but rather fit within the scope of Commercial Speech Doctrine. First, intermediate scrutiny is appropriate given that the end goal of a data exchange is to consummate a commercial transaction. The foregoing analysis draws on companion class action cases heard by the Southern District of New York in 2016 considering challenges to Michigan's Preservation of Personal Privacy Act (PPPA) and Video Rental Privacy Act (VRPA). Both state laws "restrict[] the sellers of certain products from disclosing the identity of individuals who purchase those products." 145 In Boelter v. Advance Magazine Publishers Inc., the parties stipulated that the personal information that was disclosed to data miners and later sold in aggregated lists constituted speech. 146 The court nevertheless found that "even outside the advertising context, speech may in certain circumstances be subject to less stringent scrutiny based on its 'plainly commercial nature and effect,'" and applied intermediate scrutiny. 149 Acknowledging the shift to an information currency model, the court found that the disclosure of data is "primarily, if not entirely-an economic act."
150 Implicit in this analysis is the sense that activity in the service of an economic transaction does not reach the lofty goals set out for full First Amendment protection.
Second, either approach of treating consumer purchase reports as effectuating privacy interests or as characterizing data as principally commercial lead to an application of intermediate scrutiny. In Boelter v. Advance Magazine Publishers Inc., the court acknowledged, " [W] hether the sale of data to third parties for targeted solicitation of consumers is commercial speech appears to be an open question in the Second Circuit." 151 The general understanding, however, was that it warranted qualified protection. 152 The Advance Magazine court's approach to applying the intermediate scrutiny tranche is noteworthy because privacy considerations surrounding the data precluded a strict scrutiny analysis. 153 In light of the Supreme Court's continued discomfort with the scope of commercial speech, an emphasis on 154 This finding holds in two respects: (i) strict scrutiny should not be the prism through which data regulation is evaluated, and (ii) privacy interests supply the significant government interest necessary for a regulation to surpass intermediate scrutiny.
Third, that the disclosure of consumer data is of interest only to a limited universe of persons supports extending qualified, rather than full, First Amendment protection. Robert Post's participatory conception of the First Amendment suggests that commercial speakers enjoy reduced protections because the speech does not promote a democratic function. Further, if the Commercial Speech Doctrine is intended to vindicate listener interests, the listener plays no active role in either collection or transmission of his data.
The appeal of preserving an intermediate scrutiny framework is twofold. Intermediate scrutiny, as opposed to leveling up to a strict scrutiny framework, acknowledges the indispensable role privacy plays in the exchange of the personal data. The test is flexible enough to accommodate a spectrum of data comprising varying degrees of privacy interests. Intermediate scrutiny balances Neil Richards' concern that the calls of Lochner in the Information Age will deny the government's ability to regulate data flows, and Jane Bambauer's readiness to launch a new paradigm for economic transactions that handicaps any regulation ex ante. To the extent data contains speech properties, rational basis is an inappropriate standard of review. Rational basis review is the most deferential standard, an acquiescence by the judiciary to the legislative process.
155 But when the legislature is engaged in curtailing speech, rational basis would undermine the raison d'être of the First Amendment as guardian of self-governance and robust critiques of institutions of power.
156 Privacy interests also caution against applying strict scrutiny to regulations seeking to cabin uses of personal data exchanged in a commercial context.
"Step 0" Central Hudson Analysis
The threshold inquiry for an application of qualified intermediate scrutiny is that the speech is lawful and not misleading. Speech failing to meet this requirement is filtered out from any application of the Central Hudson test. This section considers two nascent applications of data collection and transmission of questionable legality that have triggered pre-existing laws: (i) data scraping and (ii) data-driven discrimination. 
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An open issue before the courts is the legality of "data scraping," a process by which third parties use software code to gain access to a service platform and mass download data without either the service platform's or the user's express consent.
157
Cambridge Analytica's mechanism of obtaining Facebook user data in Spring 2018 through a quiz application constituted a form of data scraping. 158 Challenges to the use of scraping tend to be lodged as violations of pre-existing anti-fraud, privacy, and copyright laws. 159 The Ninth Circuit is currently considering a high-profile appeal that could decide, among other things, the ownership of data placed on social media platforms. That case, hiQ v. LinkedIn, involves a start-up that deploys bots to scrape allegedly publicly available data from LinkedIn users' profile pages. 160 As emphasized in an amicus brief, "[p]ersonal data is central to this case even though users are not represented in this proceeding." 161 hiQ, represented by Professor Laurence Tribe, markets its business model as talent-management that is "informed by public data sources," 162 including LinkedIn's "public" data. LinkedIn, represented by former Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., claims hiQ "expropriates member data from LinkedIn's servers on a massive scale," then profits off the sale of that data. 158. In his testimony submitted to Congress, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg admitted that third parties were able to scrape its users' data. However, he reiterated Facebook's policy prohibiting third parties from selling or licensing such data and from sharing that data "with any ad network, data broker or other advertising or monetization-related service. 165 It would not be unreasonable for users with a "public view" setting to expect that their information would be subject to data collection; in uploading information, the user may be relinquishing a privacy right. 166 The district court wrestled with the implications of according LinkedIn the authority to deny access to publicly available information as this move "could pose an ominous threat to public discourse and the free flow of information promised by the Internet."
167
The district court's order is notable in another respect: it failed to find convincing hiQ's First Amendment claim that LinkedIn is a public forum. Although hiQ obtained its preliminary injunction, it won by challenging the applicability of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 168 and state competition law, not the First Amendment. To be sure, the district court may have impliedly declined to reach the First Amendment question on constitutional avoidance grounds. 169 However, should the Ninth Circuit apply the CFAA to prevent unauthorized data scraping, it will reinforce a "step 0" inquiry whereby certain methods of data collection and transmission fall outside the scope of protectable speech. Facebook's "Exclude People" button enables advertisers to carve out their desired audiences. 173 A 2016 ProPublica study found that no mechanism exists "to prevent ad buyers from purchasing ads related to employment/housing and then excluding based on . . . illegal characteristics," such as race, sex, or religion. 174 In the light of this reporting, two class actions-including one filed by the National Fair Housing Alliance-are pending in federal court, each challenging "the functioning of Facebook's online advertising tools and alleged discrimination." 175 As of the time of publication, the plaintiffs in these actions have joined in settlement negotiations with Facebook, which might prevent a full accounting of Facebook's practices. 176 Though Facebook maintains that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act insulates it from liability, 177 it is the platform's algorithm that matches the advertisement with the audience. 178 The argument that Facebook has inserted itself in the commercial speech arena flows from finding that the algorithm has a speechlike quality akin to the computer code. 179 This threshold inquiry permits liability actions for violations of anti-discrimination statutes by determining Facebook has shed the role of a disinterested Internet server.
b. Discrimination in Housing and Employment Advertisements
Customized advertising hosted online reflects a drastic shift from billboards and "the classifieds." 180 Online platforms offer the means to deny users access to advertisements that marketers have determined are "not of interest." This feature ensures a user might never discover such discrimination, robbing that user of a cognizable injury on which to stake a claim. 181 Concern about paternalism-filtering what pertinent information a consumer could receive-motivated the Supreme Court when deciding the early commercial speech cases. Here, a private actor, not the state, facilitates cognizable facial discrimination by preferentially selecting certain individuals for commercial and housing opportunities.
Privacy as a Substantial Government Interest
The qualified constitutional protection framework articulated in Central Hudson requires that the regulation further a "substantial" government interest. In the context of data collection and transmission, privacy interests are oft-cited grounds upon which to regulate.
182 That said, the Court has intimated that it is not wildly receptive to invocations of privacy as a defensible motivation for regulations which burden the exercise of the First Amendment. 183 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that the government cannot merely "assert[] a broad interest in privacy" without some particular justification. 184 But, as Professor Bhagwat notes, privacy interests are unlike the "highly paternalistic approach" which caused consternation among the Justices. 185 Concern over suppressing the public dissemination of truthful information largely motivated the Court's decision in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.
186 Privacy, however, implicates the individual on a decidedly different basis than speech on "matters of public concern" or in non-targeted advertising.
187
Applying Post's theory, the lack of self-governing principles does not warrant increased protections for user data, such as would suggest applying strict scrutiny to any proposed regulation.
188 Last, privacy exists on a spectrum, suggesting that successful regulations will articulate particularized privacy interests. 
IV. SOLUTIONS
In considering how to structure workable regulations to address issues raised by targeted advertising, the factors set out in Edenfield v. Fane 190 provide an instructive blueprint, more so than lessons gleaned from Sorrell. Edenfield considers, inter alia, (i) the identities of parties involved; (ii) the particular circumstances contextualizing the solicitation; (iii) whether the speaker is a "professional trained in the art of persuasion;" and (iv) whether the audience is liable to be manipulated. 191 These factors are flexible to accommodate the technological shift that has moved personal solicitations from the bedside of an accident victim to the screen of a Facebook user browsing on a personal device. Facially, distinctions between the two situations are readily available. However, the pervasive nature of certain Internet Information Economy platforms and the degree to which personal data can be amassed means that communications from such a platform can persist far longer than a mailer.
A proposal banning personal solicitations lacks practical and legal support. The Internet Information Economy ushered in a revenue model relying principally on advertising. This Note does not seek to uproot this paradigm by advocating that Facebook move to a subscription-based model. Such a solution would be an overreach and disfavored under constitutional avoidance. Nor would current users broadly embrace this change having grown accustomed to "free" services.
192
Any proposal in this Part runs into criticisms of paternalism.
193 Indeed, the majority in Virginia Board grounded its analysis on vindicating the individual's autonomy. 194 While the government's purposeful intervention ought not to be blindly sanctioned, claims of paternalism ignore two fundamental differences between commercial and non-commercial speech. First, the commercial speaker, de facto, "distorts" dialogue with an audience. 195 Currently, Internet Information Economy platforms self-regulate, having thus far resisted attempts to install a governmental oversight regime. 196 The benign neglect approach preserves the status quo by refusing to disrupt the technology disrupters. Facebook and similar entities could continue to rely on their algorithms, without requiring manpower oversight to sift through advertisements or uses of data.
197 No First Amendment interests are implicated under this model. This option delays determination of whether the data harvested for targeted advertising have speech qualities, resists criticism of government action as paternalistic, and avoids inquiring into whether consumers are sophisticated parties when sharing data.
But consumers would not be without recourse, even should the government opt not to intervene with a satisfying legal regime. In response to the "creep" of targeted advertising, various self-help remedies have emerged in the Internet space, including, inter alia, affirmatively deleting cookies 198 or installing ad blocker technology.
reprieve and can be implemented on a personal device far faster than any legislation will wind its way through Congress.
Robust Compelled Disclosures for Targeted Advertising
This proposal contemplates a regulation obligating Internet Information Economy platforms to disclose to users the specific data points used to service a targeted advertisement, thereby revealing why the user was seeing a particular advertisement. Requiring disclosure of the sources driving the advertisements would not be viewpoint-discriminatory, under Sorrell, so as to subject it to heightened scrutiny. This proposal has implicit support within the industry itself: in 2014, Facebook announced installation of "Why am I seeing this Ad," which accompanies each advertisement it displays for a user. 200 Facebook launched this initiative in response to concerns that advertisements had gotten too "personal."
201 Addressing backlash from "dark posts," Facebook is currently testing a feature whereby any user may view all advertisements that an advertiser is currently running.
202 A regulation would merely codify what platforms have demonstrated a willingness to implement.
Informing consumers as to how their data is used in targeted advertising empowers them to alter their behavior in response and addresses the asymmetrical relationship between consumers and data marketers. 203 Assuming industry compliance, the drawback to such a solution is user saturation: depending on the configuration of the disclosure, a user may find innumerable data points in service of advertisements. Yet, providing this information enables the individual to evaluate whether he deems the data relatively innocuous or worthy of affirmative action. Thus, this proposal vindicates a primary objective of the Commercial Speech Doctrine.
Compelled disclosure in Commercial Speech Doctrine, while a nascent area of First Amendment jurisprudence, functions as a means to prevent consumer deception. 204 A compelled disclosure regulation regarding an advertisement that did not otherwise change the content of the speech nor its intended audience would likely be subject to a low tier of scrutiny. Scholars have proposed that disclosures in a COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS
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Economy. 215 Judicial intransigence would foreclose evaluating the above-detailed solutions under intermediate scrutiny and, instead, would subject data-driven targeted advertising to the more stringent, strict scrutiny standard of review.
Expanding Liability Under the Communications Decency Act
As discussed above in Part III.C, violations of pre-existing laws such as antidiscrimination statutes, fall outside the qualified constitutional protection matrix. The current legal regime under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 216 however, insulates Internet Information Economy platforms from liability, where the platforms are not content generators, despite their hospitality to advertisers operating with discriminatory intent. 217 As applied, Section 230 provides federal and state immunity for "service providers," 218 defeating most claims brought against Facebook and similar interactive service providers at the initial stages of litigation.
219
This proposed shift in liability acknowledges that the new paradigm of employment and housing advertisements entails users engaged in job hunting on sites like Facebook and LinkedIn. Similarly, the majority of American adults who are active on Facebook consume news not from reading newspapers, but via curated "Newsfeeds." 220 In this respect, the Internet Information Economy-and the algorithms connecting users to a curated experience-have moved away from mere passive conduits of information, warranting an update to the legal regime.
Regulating Social Media Platforms as "Utilities"
A final approach considers regulating Internet Information Economy platforms as broadcasters, considering the displacement of traditional broadcasters in favor of the Internet as the primary source of communication and the impact of quasi-215. This concern is likewise shared by Tomain, supra note 210, at 44 ("If the current definition of commercial speech does not include data processing by commercial actors, then the definition ought to be expanded to include this substantial area of our information economy").
216. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act establishes that "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
217. See discussion Part III.C.2, supra, on current litigation regarding the degree to which Facebook's advertising auction platform results in discrimination along the metrics used to identify viewers. monopolistic actors. 221 Labeling these platforms as such will enable legislators to apply consumer protections more easily. 222 Traditional broadcasters are unable to personalize advertisements, thus ensuring a "strong disincentive[] . . . to disseminate materially false, inflammatory, or contradictory messages to the public." 223 The lack of such a check within the Internet Information Economy warrants regulations on commercial speech, mindful of the need to ensure the individual consumer is apprised of neither misleading nor fraudulent statements.
However, a few structural distinctions between traditional broadcasters and Internet Information Economy platforms undermine this proposal. First, whereas traditional broadcast traded access to airwaves on governmental regulation, the Internet suffers from no literal analogous "scarcity" issue. The response is that Facebook and similar entities such as Google operate as de facto monopolies bolstered by network effects and high user engagement. 224 Second, while platforms in the Internet Information Economy may function in practice as broadcasters, imposing a broadcast regulatory framework would represent an ex post solution, compared to government's ex ante decision to license traditional broadcasters. Third, platforms in the Internet Information Economy, unlike traditional broadcasters, function as troves of user data, whereas broadcasters contract with third party firms such as Nielsen to acquire information regarding trends in viewership. 225 Characterizing Internet Information Economy participants as dispensaries for news glosses over the role they also play as commercialized data banks and risks losing the hook to labeling their conduct as commercial speech.
V. CONCLUSION
While the Internet Information Economy has democratized information sharing, a gap in the law persists regarding its data collection and transmission practices. This Note has proposed initiatives derived from first principles of the Commercial Speech Doctrine in order to address a lack of transparency and the individual's loss of 221 . This radical approach to regulate social media platforms as utilities garnered some bipartisan support from members in both the Obama and Trump administrations. Further, over a decade ago, Mark Zuckerberg emphasized "the utility component" of Facebook. Laura Locke, The Future of Facebook, TIME (July 17, 2007), https://perma.cc/EB3D-2P2C.
222. In the wake of accusations that Facebook failed to police adequately purchasers of ad space during the 2016 election season, a bipartisan group of Senators introduced a proposed bill, the "Honest Ads Act." Although targeted specifically at regulating political advertisements, the bill highlights the fact that "social media platforms . . . can target portions of the electorate with direct, ephemeral advertisements on the basis of private information the platform has on individuals." The Honest Ads Act is cabined in scope to political advertisements made online but the reasoning can encompass similar concerns in any targeted advertisement. Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong., https://perma.cc/7D22-RJZV. , https://perma.cc/HZY5-GKJB. However, the value of having firsthand information about viewers is clearly evident about traditional broadcasters as evidenced by the relatively recent jump to online streaming services, a byproduct of which is that broadcasters have access to that information directly.
autonomy surrounding personalized commercial speech. Recognizing a substantial government interest in preventing listener deception and manipulation and cognizant of limitations imposed by the First Amendment, the proposals contained in this Note do not advocate for reduced speech, nor do they segment out commercial speakers. Rather, any proposals would increase relevant speech to assist the consumer.
Data collection and transmission practices represent the new paradigmatic way in which commercial speakers interact with their audiences. To the extent that First Amendment scholars seek to protect data related activity, their arguments should be grounded on a commercial speech paradigm that embraces first principles, rather than shoehorning arguments into the Supreme Court's increasingly speaker focused commercial speech jurisprudence. Ultimately, the solutions advocated for here can engender a market place of ideas through the Internet Information Economy that is informationally-symmetric for both speakers and listeners in a manner that is designed to fulfill the First Amendment potential of new and social media.
